

# Return Migration and Re-Integration into Croatia and Kosovo

#### Roundtable

May 11-12, 2015

Croatian Heritage Foundation, Zagreb/Croatia

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# **Table of Content**

1.	INT	RODUCTION: ROUNDTABLE GOAL	3	
2.	BAG	CKGROUND: MIGRATION & DIASPORA	4	
	2.1 H	storical and Economic Perspective	4	
	2.2	Diaspora Numbers		
	2.3	Diasporas' Socio-demographic Profile	5	
	2.4	Recommendations and policy considerations	5	
3	RETURN		6	
	3.1	Who Returns and Why?	6	
	3.2	Challenges upon Return	6	
	3.3	Recommendations and policy considerations		
4	HO	MELAND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND POLICY		
	4.1	Recommendations and policy considerations	9	
5	DEV	VELOPMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS BY DIASPORAS		
	5.1	Remittances and Investment	9	
	5.2	Recommendations and policy considerations	. 10	
6	COI	NCLUSIONS		
Al	ANNEX: AGENDA13			

#### 1. INTRODUCTION: ROUNDTABLE GOAL

KNOMAD Thematic Working Group <u>Integration Issues in Host Communities</u> organized the roundtable *Return Migration and Re-integration into Croatia and Kosovo* in Zagreb, Croatia, on May 11th and 12th, 2015, which was hosted by the Croatian Heritage Foundation. Over twenty presenters and discussants from Kosovo and Croatia, as well as other audiences with a stake in migration and reintegration management participated in the roundtable.

The specific issues to be explored were left open for participants' consideration, in view of their own experiences as émigrés, researchers, or as policy makers in the two countries. The goal was to probe the project's hypothesis that return migration and homeland reintegration promote development through the transfer of enhanced human and social capital that migrants commonly acquire in their host society integration. Underscoring this hypothesis is the idea that economic development has its roots in human activity and cooperation; that is, it builds on human and social capital and on their interaction for productive purposes. This understanding raises the relevance of migrants' integration in host societies and their reintegration in homelands as development factors in an era of continuous mobility.

Given the above-mentioned understanding, the roundtable discussions centered on the following question: What should governments, businesses, and other sectors do to advance the development potential inherent in migration? In particular, the onus was on how policy in the homeland can facilitate the transfer of émigrés' enhanced human capital. Previous exchanges by this KNOMAD Thematic Working Group with stakeholders<sup>1</sup> had revealed that, in order to yield development benefits, return migration and reintegration requires active management, along the same lines that integration does. So, the conversation in Zagreb was held with the goal to see what works well, what does not, and what lessons other countries can learn from the experience of Croatia and Kosovo.

Under the Chatham House rule,<sup>2</sup> this report captures the perspectives put forward during the two days of presentations and discussions, highlighting policy recommendations and considerations for each of the sections that make its content.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See <u>Migrant Re-integration and Homeland Development: Policy Prospects and Potential</u>, March 4, 2014, Ottawa, Canada. <u>Background and Agenda</u> | <u>Seminar Summary</u> | <u>List of Participants</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Under the Chatham House rule, the identity and affiliation of the speakers, as well as of participants, is not disclosed in relation to the content included in the report. For more information on the Chatham House Rule, see http://www.chathamhouse.org/about-us/chathamhouserule

### 2. BACKGROUND: MIGRATION & DIASPORA

# 2.1 Historical and Economic Perspective

Croatian and Kosovar migration dynamics draw on the larger historical southeast European mobility patterns, including overseas seasonal labor migration, forced migration, political migration, as well as economic and career migration.

Both countries experienced peak emigration during their independence wars in the 1990s. While some of their émigrés have returned, as is the case with Croatians participating in the war reconstruction of their country, many continue living in the countries where they emigrated. For example, it is estimated that about 30,000 Kosovars remained in the countries of destination and continue residing and working there, particularly with the current homeland gross domestic product at 3,000 Euros per capita and the unemployment rate at 40%. Although now part of the European Union and having known a period of reconstruction and economic recovery, including foreign and diaspora investment, Croatia has registered falling gross domestic product figures for the past 6 years; tourism constitutes its largest economic branch, imports exceed exports, and national debt is high.

Current migration trends point to emigration exceeding immigration levels in both Croatia and Kosovo, a situation highly influenced by continuing economic problems faced by both countries, some stemming from the 2008 crisis. This challenging economic environment makes it more difficult to encourage return migration and reintegration. In Croatia, immigration is related mainly to flows from former Yugoslavia and Germany (e.g. foreign born migrants are less than 1% of the total population). In Kosovo, in-coming flows are typically linked to repatriation, at a rate of 5,000 people per year.

Statistics on migration are problematic, since there is no systematic registration of movements within all migration categories for either of the two countries. However, both Croatia and Kosovo are in the process of establishing mechanisms to keep track of cross-border mobility patterns and numbers, in an attempt to set up policy that capitalizes on their development potential.

### 2.2 Diaspora Numbers

Given the rich patterns of migration, diasporas are broadly dispersed and numbers are difficult to calculate. In addition, the many different definitions of what actually constitutes diaspora influence the figures that researchers and policy makers articulate.

According to some estimates, about 2 million Croatians (approx. half of the total population) and 800,000 Kosovars (approx. a third of the total population) would currently live and work abroad. In the case of Croatia, over two centuries of migration have led to the formation of one of the largest diaspora in the world. Of the Kosovars émigrés, about 17,000 are registered in Croatia, which contributes to excellent political and social bilateral agreements, and an increasing interest to advance economic relations, between Croatia and Kosovo. It is important to mention that, according to Eurostat, 158,755 Kosovars have asked for asylum since 2008, with 28,000 of them doing so in Germany in 2015. There are efforts towards development and migration status regularization, including through action taken by the German government via publicly-owned organizations that assist in migration management either directly (e.g. offering counseling, financial assistance, and access to networks for voluntary and forced returnees), or indirectly (e.g. approach-

ing migration as a cross-cutting theme -- they work to develop the private sector, provide education, promote youth employment, or run subsidy-based social transfer programs that emphasize circular migration schemes).

# 2.3 Diasporas' Socio-demographic Profile

There is a fundamental distinction between the Kosovar and Croatian diasporas' socio-demographic profiles. Croatian diaspora generally enjoy legal status, including citizenship, in the countries that made their destination at some point in their lives, with a wide geographic distribution, from Europe, particularly Germany, to Australia, North and South America, and elsewhere. The rich history of emigration from Croatia led to established diaspora networks worldwide, which played a central role in the fight for state independence. Also, Croatian diaspora now comprise second generation adults, who have maintained contact with homeland, mainly through their family environment, some of whom have already 'come back' or are willing to 'come back'. The potential for return among them is high: these are people who often experience feelings of belonging in neither country, or who identify themselves either as Croatians or hyphenated Croatians, and whose human capital has formed in multicultural societies. They are open to change, embrace a cosmopolitan attitude, and are guided by strong work ethic and determination. Against the backdrop of a different historical evolution, Kosovo's émigrés are in the categories of illegal migrants, family members, highly skilled migrants, and asylum seekers. They mainly choose destinations in Europe (e.g. Germany, Switzerland) and less in USA or in Australia. If before 1989, 80% of Kosovar outmigration figures constituted unskilled labor, post-1990s, the proportion of skilled labor increased to 35% (i.e. people in their 50s, with strong connections at home, which partially explains intense remittance practices), while irregular migration reached its peak between 2012 and 2014, relatively stabilizing afterwards.

# 2.4 Recommendations and policy considerations

Both Croatia and Kosovo lack a body of research into issues of migration and diaspora. Statistics and more knowledge of the particulars of diasporas' political, economic, and social experiences in host societies and at home are needed to inform migration and reintegration policy and to set up social and economic programs to meet specific needs. Recommendations were made for data collection, including putting together research projects to be funded by EU research bodies, establishing research partnerships with counterparts in countries of destination, or setting up undergraduate and graduate academic programs aimed at studying migration and diaspora. Also, it would be in the interest of homelands to develop cultural and social programs abroad via their embassies and consulates, in order to maintain a socio-cultural profile close to 'home' for their diasporas. For example, strengthening ethnic identity and pride could be done through organization of regular cultural events and in-class or online mother tongue education for 2nd generation, circulation of positive stories about diasporas, whether in the homeland or in host societies, and so on.

### 3. RETURN

# 3.1 Who Returns and Why?

Return migration to Kosovo and Croatia is not easy to track, given the complex residency status, dual citizenship, and continuous mobility. This shapes multiple migration patterns rather than fixed and predictable trajectories, which could otherwise be regularly monitored. Some studies indicate about 40,000 returnees in Croatia in the 1990s, while forced return figures in Kosovo get to 5,000 repatriates every year.

The two countries differ considerably when it comes to their diasporas' return. While Croatians return mainly out of desire to resettle and because they see the potential to invest (e.g. tourism, consumption industry, real estate) and make their lives in the homeland, such examples are very limited in the case of Kosovo. Also, given the long-time participation of Croatian diaspora in the political and economic history of the country and their full integration in host societies, they are now in the position to consider returning and contribute to their homeland development as an independent state.

Most Kosovars who return do so either because the prospects of further work abroad have come to an end, or through the special voluntary and forced return programs within the EU. In regards to brain gain, presentations highlighted that Kosovo does not have the capacity to be domestically competitive at this point, which is why programs and policies focus on facilitating exchanges, regularizing status in host societies, and fostering investments, rather than on particularly attracting diasporas. For example, there are efforts to create diaspora professional profiles and to establish networks that would support Kosovar immigrants to integrate well in their host societies (e.g. lawyers networks now in Switzerland and Germany).

From a homeland perspective, the push factors for both countries are generally related to domestic triggers like youth unemployment, poor upward mobility, clientele-like structures, corruption, and to appealing conditions abroad, such as higher income, greater life satisfaction, or personal freedom and security. The factors that have proven to pull diasporas back home include changes in the political system and social-economic environment, family ties, life-long plans like raising children, or work-life balance.

### 3.2 Challenges upon Return

It became clear that homeland return poses challenges that are most often rooted in different work and political cultures, which makes the transfer of diasporas' enhanced human capital and its potential for development an issue that requires proactive management.

On the one hand, a rather adversarial public opinion towards returnees in both Croatia and Kosovo (e.g. stereotyping, reluctance to engage) often leaves them alienated and discouraged. Such negative public opinion generally builds on a lasting tradition of nationalism, a history of ethnic politics in former Yugoslavia, and on the lack of knowledge among Croatian and Kosovar host populations about the sacrifices and not always prosperous lives of the émigrés abroad. The feelings of alienation, frustration, and non-satisfaction among returnees are compounded by the barriers raised in administration -- issues of education credential recognition, corruption, and remnants of past structures and mentalities (e.g. enemy of the state, disloyalty) add to the public

servants' resistant attitudes. Echoed in the general population, such resistance is underlined in its turn by perceptions of abandonment by diasporas in times of need.

On the other hand, it was acknowledged that returnees often come back with superior, paternalistic approaches (e.g. "I'll teach you" attitude). This stems from awareness of their enhanced human potential, including knowledge and practice of democratic work cultures and structures acquired abroad. However, they soon learn that capacity building takes time, especially when state management experience is relatively limited, as is the case with the young states of Kosovo and Croatia. In this respect, it turned out that second generation Croatian immigrant returnees usually and paradoxically enjoy success in the homeland faster than their first generation peers; the explanation lies in the lack of expectations about their 'homeland' and in their consequent higher adaptability and flexibility 'on the ground'.

Also, challenges returnees encounter relate to patronage and corruption systems, lack of transparency and accountable administration, and deficient implementation of existent policy. Whether it was Kosovar or Croatian participants, they indicated appreciation for the content of reintegration policies and strategies, but critiqued the process through which it is translated into practice. Navigating governmental websites or getting access to different services in Croatia, for example, is often a convoluted, tiresome process, triggered by lack of information, high bureaucracy, and general poor management.

A particular concern in discussions was the situation of the children of repatriated Kosovars, among whom the school drop-out rate is very high. One of the causes is the absence of schools in their mother tongue -- as children of Roma who were born or grew up in Germany, most of them speak Roma and German, but they are placed in either Serbian or Albanian schools upon return. Another reason is the fact that their parents plan to go back to the host society, in spite of the emergency assistance (e.g. housing, healthcare) and, more recently, the long-term support (e.g. vocational training) they are offered at home.

The issue of language skills also came up in discussions about second generation Croatian diaspora, including children. First, other than the family environment, the opportunities for children to learn their mother tongue in the host society are almost inexistent. This weakens their connection to Croatian culture and leads to challenges upon return, in particular school reintegration. Second, the capacity of second generation adult returnees to be fully functional in their mother tongue upon return is not always the case. In such circumstances, using the social system is more difficult, especially with the lack of translated versions of important reintegration resources (e.g. websites, brochures, guides).

### 3.3 Recommendations and policy considerations

What easily transpired in the roundtable discussions is that reintegration challenges are similar to those experienced in the integration process and pertain to both structural and personal factors. On the structural side, improving policy management, dissemination of information, transparency, and accountability in homeland institutions came high on the agenda of recommendations for rapid reintegration and retention of returnees.

A series of measures participants endorsed are related to education, such as education credential recognition and harmonization of homeland education approaches with those in the countries where diasporas have settled. It was also highlighted that larger diversity education among host populations in Croatia and Kosovo would not only increase much-needed openness to their returnees and foreign investors, but would also create a welcoming environment for potential refugee intakes under EU obligations in the case of the former.

There was unanimous agreement that returnees' enhanced human potential cannot serve development goals without social capital. The two are essential for how quickly homelands can capitalize on the return of their émigrés. Consequently, policy makers in the homeland should cultivate this social capital by setting up welcome and introduction programs and other support networks to assist diaspora in the reintegration process (e.g. searching for jobs, securing various documents and licences, etc.).

On the personal side, returnees would benefit from adopting inter-personal strategies and developing soft skills, in particular to avoid perceptions of superiority and to prevent social marginalisation. The example of returning scientists was given, where such adaptation strategies could include partnerships with peers, acceptance of hierarchies, seniority, and the rule of the game, patience and resilience. However, networks and institutional support (e.g. advisors, peers, and help groups) are critical in the formation of diasporas' homeland cultural competencies. Ultimately, human capital transfers are matters of psychological and social-cultural interactions.

### 4. HOMELAND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND POLICY

Both countries have a rich institutional framework and a number of policy initiatives and programs to address issues related to migration and diaspora. In Croatia, there are the Ministry of Immigration, the Central State Office, the Council of the Government of Croatia for the Croatians outside the Republic of Croatia, Croatian Heritage Foundation, the Strategy for Relations between Croatia and Diaspora, the Migration Policy, the Unity through Knowledge Fund, etc. In Kosovo, the main institutions dealing with migration matters are the Department of Citizenship, Asylum, and Integration (within the Ministry of Internal Affairs), the Ministry of Diaspora, and the Ministry of Communities and Return (only covering internal migration issues), while the 2013 and 2015 National Strategy for Migration and Integration focuses on migration management, including readmission policy and a reintegration program with a fund created at several levels of state budget.

Given the high emigration figures and irregular movements, migration is an important aspect of the relations between Kosovo and the EU, aiming at regularization of status. On the other hand, as a EU member, Croatia must follow secondary instruments of the EU, but has authority in defining national needs and interests.

# 4.1 Recommendations and policy considerations

One of the central points coming out of discussions was the stringent need for cooperation among ministries and governmental institutions/departments and for coordination between national and local levels of administration, in order for the otherwise well designed strategies and programs to work well.

Also, there were recommendations for boosting the administrative capacity, including providing training for officials, and for explicitly improving the management of government policy. In spite of the challenges they encounter, overall, skilled returnees are successful, but few of them end up in working for government institutions, especially in Kosovo. Opening up such institutions and gearing them towards attracting returnees, while also reforming them for merit-based upward mobility, transparency, and accountability, was one of the most prominent recommendations. Brain gain programs like the one currently in implementation in Kosovo (whereby young graduates can pursue an MA degree in the EU and return home for work within the government for 2-3 years) are good initiatives, but structures need to be set in place to allow participation beyond public administration functions.

#### 5. DEVELOPMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS BY DIASPORAS

#### 5.1 Remittances and Investment

Participants focused a good part of discussions on the importance of remittances for their homelands. In the case of Croatia, remittances historically supported the economy either formally or informally (e.g. black market in times of the embargo on former Yugoslavia) and played a central part in the financial efforts for state independence. At approximately 1 billion Euros a year, the contribution for today's national economy is significant. However, it was pointed out that there are also out-flows of remittances to Bosnia, where Croatian ethnics live and work.

At 620.8 million Euros per year, the value of remittances to Kosovo (i.e. cash, goods, visiting money) exceeds foreign aid. It represents up to 17-20% of the GDP and is relatively stable, more stable than foreign investment or remittances in other countries (i.e. 25% of households in Kosovo receive remittances on a regular basis). Nevertheless, the participants indicated that most of it is used for everyday consumption purposes, decreasing thus poverty with family units, but not generating the wealth needed for sustainable economic growth (i.e. only 3.9% of remittances is used for business investment). Consequently, there is a number of initiatives by the Ministry of Diaspora in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kosovo to set up effective mechanisms that would allow channeling remittances for economic development.

Presentations highlighted foreign investment as a critical goal in Kosovar development policy, with diaspora investments categorized as foreign investments. Even if increasing lately, the overall value of direct foreign investment in Kosovo remains low (5% of GDP) and has little value added (e.g. investments in real estate, constructions, production sector, finances, transport and telecommunications). It mainly comes from countries like Switzerland, Turkey, Albania, and Germany, and is assumed to be generated or influenced by Kosovar diaspora settled there. In Croatia, examples of investments by returnees are largely in the tourism and shopping industries,

with many such investments by 2nd generation diaspora coming back from North and South America and Australia.

Both Croatia and Kosovo allow dual citizenship and have policy for citizenship acquisition by their non-citizen diasporas. While this is very likely to enhance return, it was acknowledged that a favorable political-economic environment needs to accompany citizenship policy. A worrisome current in Kosovo is the fact that national citizenship is given up at a rate of 5,000 per year, most likely by Kosovars who want to become fully-fledged citizens in countries of destination that do not allow dual citizenship (e.g. Germany). Relatively easy citizenship re-instatement can address this situation later, if case may be.

# **5.2** Recommendations and policy considerations

Attention was drawn that remittances do not constitute a sustainable economic development tool. Long-term integration in host societies tends to trigger lower remittances, with new generations typically having lower levels of attachment to homeland. In this respect, the recommendation for policy aiming to maintain and enhance connection with the country of origin, in view of return and investment, was reinforced.

Investment is considered a more viable approach to economic development. Hence, the continuing struggle to reform regulatory and administrative systems to ease investment costs, human resource costs, and other transaction costs in both countries. It was agreed that emotional attachment gives homelands investment priority among diasporas, but that economic value cannot be replaced by sentimental value. Homelands should be attractive to investment by their diasporas in the same ways that they would want to attract foreign investment. Diasporas, just like foreign investors, are looking for a favorable political and economic environment, that is, political stability, the rule of law, the likelihood of profit, etc.

Measures like tax reliefs, subsidies for employment, import of new technology, infrastructural help by local authorities, and public-private partnerships were among the recommendations made to entice foreign investment in Croatia. Examples of countries the practices of which to follow were Israel, for attracting diasporas (e.g. networking with diasporas worldwide, high investments), and Ireland, for using domestic talent to develop an economic area in high-demand worldwide (e.g. IT and communications, use of EU funds).

Compared to the rather discouraging foreign investment policy in Croatia (e.g. over 50% taxes per investment), regulations in Kosovo have been reformed to foster foreign ventures, including a one stop shop for business, a low financial threshold to open a business, legalization of regimes for property purchase, and a streamlined business registration process. However, it was indicated that coordination with local administration remains critical for such measures to translate into practice. Setting up business networks and associations (e.g. Professional Association of Kosovar Bankers in Switzerland) and holding conferences and other events to introduce investment opportunities and to present successful ventures are other examples of Kosovar initiatives designed to increase foreign investment.

It was concluded that development policy should explicitly include return migration and re-integration policy and program interventions. The biggest contribution diasporas can bring to homelands' development is their human capital and international social capital. Their added value is

not limited to their financial well-being, but, most importantly, comes from their skills, knowledge, experience, international contacts, intercultural versatility, tenacity, and boldness to take action and to express themselves.

A series of policy recommendations aiming at capitalizing on this development potential were made:

- involve diasporas in homeland development strategies, including opening up government and local institutions to participation by returnees and graduates with international degrees;
- replace patronage and corruption systems with merit-based, transparent, and accountable administration;
- facilitate scientific exchanges, partnerships, and academic programs to create mobility, attract scientists, and develop the domestic knowledge base for international competitiveness;
- use diaspora as a bridge to foreign investors in host societies and set up oversight mechanisms for diaspora and foreign investments;
- promote investment advantages (e.g. cheaper labor, tax exemptions, technology skills, language skills of youth) and transnational business models;
- develop financial and investment literacy among homeland populations and diasporas;
- increase trust in the financial sector to mobilize diaspora savings;
- regularize migration flows, including through bilateral work agreements for seasonal jobs;
- offer incentive packages for diasporas' return and stay;
- engage in integration diplomacy to raise the homeland profile abroad and to encourage multiple identities.

#### 6. **CONCLUSIONS**

The KNOMAD roundtable in Zagreb put together professionals from Kosovo and Croatia who have had either direct or indirect experiences of migration and who were eager to share them, with the goal to identify best practices and gaps in migration management and ways in which they could be addressed through policy-making. What resulted is the picture of a complex, multiple migration process, which involves challenges and decision-making by different stakeholders at all times in the continuum: emigration, host society integration, return, reintegration, remigration. Continuous mobility and transnationalism came out as fundamental characteristics of this process, one that necessitates proactive management at all levels (i.e. personal, institutional, local, national) if it is to be put to development purposes.

With their transition from constituents of former Yugoslavia to independent states and from Communism to market economies, Croatia and Kosovo have both known emigration in large numbers. On the one hand, the brain drain has a negative impact on homeland, affecting the working to non-working age ratio, changing the family structure, and creating a cycle of dependency on émigrés' remittances. On the other hand, outmigration can be viewed through a positive lens, given the long-term contribution to homeland development via the transfer of human, so-

cial, and financial capital by diasporas and returnees. The roundtable presentations and discussions explored this latter perspective, by considering the development potential inherent in migration and Croatia's and Kosovo's unique positions to capitalize on it.

It is a positive step that both countries are trying explicitly to manage return and reintegration to this end. While Croatia has reached a stage when efforts for development can rely on its returnees' role, Kosovo focuses its attention on the development potential that regular migration, in particular labor emigration and remittances, can harbor. This distinction is triggered by the differentials in economic performance at home, the appeal that homeland consequently has for diasporas, and diasporas' socio-demographic profile. The two countries draw on common historical context, but have developed differently since the 1990s. Croatia is now a member of the EU and is well placed to advocate the integration of other Balkan states, including Kosovo.

The need for brain circulation, brain gain, and a culture of dialogue has been made evident in both cases; what was showed to work best for this goal is policy aimed at creating networks, in combination with mobility programs. A favorable investment environment and a stable political climate are essential ingredients for attracting diasporas and their investments. Equally important is a welcoming social milieu, where returnees and diasporas feel their mobility and multiple identities are valued and their skills rewarded on a merit basis. The roundtable also underscored the significance of research and data collection (i.e. emigration and immigration flows, migrants' health, integration, and reintegration challenges, etc.) to support not only policy development, but also a more effective and efficient delivery of public services.

All this is to say that, besides governance structures specifically addressing migration and reintegration issues, inter-ministerial collaboration and partnerships with civil society are needed to meet development challenges that cut across fields of activity beyond migration.

### **ANNEX: ROUNDTABLE'S AGENDA**

MONDAY, 11 MAY, 2015

9.00 - 9:15 h

### Welcoming remarks

Dr. Marin Sopta, Centre for Culture and Information, Zagreb

#### 9:15 - 11:00 h

#### Migration as a driver of development

Chair: Marin Knezović, Director, Croatian Heritage Foundation

Introductory remarks on the conference themes:

Dr. Howard Duncan, Chair of KNOMAD's Thematic Working Group "Integration Issues in Host Communities", and Metropolis Project, Ottawa

Introduction to KNOMAD:

Hanspeter Wyss, KNOMAD Secretariat

The importance of the issues for Croatia and Kosovo:

Dr. Marin Sopta, Centre for Culture and Information, Zagreb

Shkendije Geci Sherifi, Ambassador of Kosovo to Croatia

Dr. Vlado Sakic, Director Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences

Flaka Braha, Kosovo Ministry of Diaspora

Marin Knezović, Director, Croatian Heritage Foundation

Discussion

#### 11.00 - 11.30 h: Refreshment break

#### 11.30 - 13.00 h

#### The history of emigration, return and re-integration to Croatia and Kosovo

Chair: Mihaela Vieru, Metropolis Secretariat, Ottawa

Emigration and return migration to Croatia and Kosovo: an historical description of the phenomena with statistics

Dr. Katica Jurčević, Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Science, Zagreb

Alejtin Berisha, Universum University College, Pristina

Dr. John Čizmić, Ivo Pilar Institute for Social Sciences (retired), Zagreb

Sefadin Kuçi, Ministry of Interior, Kosovo

Discussion

# 13.00 – 14.30 h: Lunch at Restaurant of the Croatian Heritage Foundation

14.30 - 16.00 h

#### The relationship between emigration, return migration, and development

Chair: Hanspeter Wyss, KNOMAD Secretariat, Washington

The effects of return and re-integration for economic development

Don Markusic, Barrister and Solicitor, Zagreb

Marijana Babić, Babić Law Firm, Zagreb

Behar Isma, Ministry of Diaspora, Kosovo

Mrika Pepa, Senior Officer for Home Affairs, Kosovo

Agron Haydari, Promotion Agency Kosovo

Discussion

#### 16.00 - 17.30 h

# Managing migration for development benefits through government policy

Chair: Dr. Rebeka Mesarić Institute for Migration and Nationalities, Zagreb

Managing emigration from Croatia and Kosovo; diaspora relations; recruiting citizens back;

Sunčanica Skupnjak Kapić, Secretary General International Chamber of Commerce Croatia

Burim Ejupi, Executive Director at the Institute for Development Policy, Kosovo

Dr.Natasha Levak, Consultant; author of "Professional Development of Croatians in Croatia and the Diaspora", Croatia

Liridon Neziri, Head of Division for Citizenship, DCAM, Kosovo

Discussion

**TUESDAY, 12 MAY, 2015** 

9.30 - 11.00 h

The challenges of managing re-integration

Chair: Dr. Marin Sopta, Centre for Culture and Information, Zagreb

Managing return migration and re-integration; success, failures and challenges of re-integration in Croatia and Kosovo

Dr. Caroline Hornstein-Tomić, Ivo Pilar Institute for Social Sciences, Zagreb

Dr. Vincent John Batarelo, President, Vigilare, Zagreb

Alban Zogaj, Riinvest Institute for Development Research, Pristina

Yileza Berisha, Ministry of European Integration, Kosovo

11.00 - 11.30 h: Refreshment break

11.30 - 13.00 h

Towards an agenda for the future

Chair: Dr. Howard Duncan

Policy considerations for managing return and re-integration for development benefits

A moderated open discussion amongst all participants

13.00 - 13:30 h: Closing remarks, Dr. Howard Duncan, Dr. Marin Sopta

16